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The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition
David Cowan Bayne, S.J.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

If everything about the philosophy of corporate control could
be said at once, the analysis of the sale-of-control premium
would have appeared long since.1 The pressing immediacy of
the problem is intensified with each succeeding year. Recent
litigation in county, state and federal courts has proved no exception to the trend, to say nothing of numerous newspaper
reports. Norton Simon in the vanguard of his corporate minions
raised the premium question in Wheeling Steel's 2 attempted takeover of Crucible. The Circuit Court of Cook County questioned
the premium passing from Simon, Hunt Foods, and Wheeling to
the outgoing Crucible controleur in the late 1967 case of Rubin
v. Norton Simon.3
On the state level, in FenestraIncorporated v. Gulf American Land Corporation, the Supreme Court of Michigan in the
spring of 1966 left little doubt that the premium question was
far from answered:
Gulf [Gulf American Corporation] says, first of all, that there
was nothing unlawful in the means by which it obtained Fenestra's shares. Gulf concedes the obvious, that is, that it paid a
price per share greater than the market value of Fenestra but
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
1. This study of the control premium is substantially dependent
on the custodial concept of corporate control first presented in Bayne,
A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22 (1963) and
developed in a series of five later articles and a book review: Bayne,
The Sale-of-Control Quandary, 51 CoRNmL L.Q. 49 (1965); Bayne, The
Sale of Corporate Control, 33 FoRDHAm L. REv. 583 (1965); Bayne,
Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 GEo. L.J. 543 (1965); Bayne,
The Definition of Corporate Control, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 445 (1965);
Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The Weyenberg Shoe-Florsheim Case Study, 18 STAN. L. Rzv. 438 (1966); Bayne, Book Review,
The Silent Partners,35 FoRDnAM L. REV. 398 (1966).
The present article is itself the first of a new series analyzing the
sale-of-control premium from the strictly legal (in contradistinction to
the factual) aspect. This series will continue with (1) Bayne, The
Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 TEX. L. REV.
(1969), (2) The Culpability of the Parties, (3) The Sale-of-Control
Premium: The Disposition, (4) Damages in the Sale of Control (5)
The Role of the Premium-Bribe: The Presumption of Unsuitability.
2. It is no longer a Simon minion, however. The Wall Street
Journal, Nov. 2, 1967, at 4, col. 4.
3. Rubin v. Norton Simon, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
County Department Chancery Division, No. 66CH1649 (Nov. 1, 1967).
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says that there is no law which prevents a purchaser from4
paying a premium in connection with the purchase of shares.
A New York federal court, in Laurenzano v. Einbender,5
faced a simple variant of the complex problem in the redemption of the outgoing controleur's stock at an appreciable premium. This was in late 1966. From late 1967 to September, 1968
the press reported intriguing proposals and arrangements that
smacked of the same. Mr. A. King McCord, Chairman of Westinghouse Air Brake, became publicly indignant at Mr. Thomas
Mellon Evans, Chairman of Crane Company, for "'inappropriate' financial inducements, including stock options" toward
Crane's assumption of control of Wabco. "'I was shocked' at this
offer," he says." In the Shearson, Hamnmill-E.M. Warburg control takeover of Silvray-Litecraft, top Silvray executives "Messrs.
' 7
Gilbert and Gordon received $137,000 each to resign their posts.
In a suspiciously similar gambit, the incumbent controleur of
Schenley, Lewis S. Rosenstiel has been accused of accepting a substantial premium and acceding to the sale of control of Schenley
to Glen Alden "in his own self interest, and to the detriment of
other shareholders, by negotiating a sale of his own holdings in
Schenley to Glen Alden at a price 'substantially above' that
offered the other shareholders."
Equally questionable is the
seven dollar premium-39 per cent over market-Cyrus Eaton
exacted from American Export Industries as he handed over two
board positions and ostensible control of Detroit Steel.9
These examples are by no means prototypes, but simply
the latest in a long series. Over the years the amount of the
premium may have varied, but the issues have been the same.
0 was a
In 1856 the amount involved in Sugden v. Crossiand'
trivial £75, but it was nonetheless a premium for the sale of
control. In the 1899 New York case of McClure v. Law, William
R. Law succeeded in purchasing "the absolute control and management of the Life Union Association in consideration of the
4. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141
N.W.2d 36, 45 (1966). This was the same Gulf American so strongly
chastised by the Florida Land Sales Board. The Wall Street Journal,
Oct. 16, 1967 at 2, col. 5.
5. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
6. The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1968, at 1, col. 6. See also
The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 28, 1968, at 1; Feb. 21, 1968, at 11, cols.
2 and 3; Dec. 19, 1967, at 6, col. 1.
7. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 2, 1967, at 4, col. 4.
8. The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 26, 1968, at 6, cols. 2 and 3.
9. The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 27, 1968, at 4, col. 2.
10. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C.C. 1856).
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sum of $15,000." 11 In the 1914 Pennsylvania case of Porter v.
Healy,'12 the directors "sold . . . control as their individual estate" and received an $86,830 "bonus" for it. 13 In the two Reynolds Metals14 cases, 20 years apart, the premiums were $1.3 million and $40 million respectively. And so it has gone through
the years, with Perlman v. Feldmann in 1955 ($2.1 million),15
Green Giant in 1961 ($2 million),16 Essex Universal in 1962 ($2
million), 17 the New York Lionel litigation of mid-1964 ($135,000) 18
and Ferraioliv. Cantorin 1967 ($2.2 million) .19
The importance of the premium is incalculable. From -a
strictly extrinsic standpoint, the premium has occasioned most
modern control litigation. Here, after all, is where the money
lies. The tangible and estimable harm to the corporation has
surfaced in the form of the premium and afforded the requisite
opportunity to bring the malefactors to justice. Intrinsically, the
premium analysis is the end of the philosophical line. It poses,
and answers, a myriad of questions, thereby illustrating and substantiating the basic control principles, particularly the custodial
concept of corporate control. The premium, its inner nature, its
legitimacy or illegitimacy, disposition and role, constitute the
superstructure of the control edifice. The court's award of £75
in Sugden,20 or $135,000 in Gabriel-Lionel2' 108 years later, is
the practical implementation of a philosophical theory. To
indulge in metaphor, the premium piece is the last in the control
puzzle. In this sense, perhaps, the premium is of great intrinsic
importance. If the last piece of the puzzle does not fit, something
is essentially wrong.
11. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 79, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899).
12. Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
13. Id. at 433, 91 A. at 430.
14. Manacher v. Reynolds, 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741 (1960);
Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
15. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
16. Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962).
17. Essex Universal v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
18. Matter of Lionel Corp., 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 24, at 14, col. 3 (Feb. 4,
1964), affd sub nom., Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246
N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d
877 (1964). [hereinafter cited as Matter of Lionel Corp.] Gabriel Indus.,
Inc. v. Defiance Indus., Inc., (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) in 151 N.Y.L.J. No.
119, at 13, col. 8 (June 17, 1964) (Serafite, J.), alf'd mem., 23 App. Div.
2d 630, 260 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1st Dep't 1965), modified, 22 N.Y.2d 405, 293
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1968).

19. 281 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

20. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C.C. 1856).
21. Gabriel Indus., Inc. v. Defiance Indus., Inc., (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), in 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 119, at 13, col. 8 (June 17, 1964), (Serafite,
J.), a fd mem., 23 App. Div. 2d 630, 260 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1st Dep't 1965).
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II. THE SCOPE OF THE DEFINITION
A.

PREmnums AND PREmIums

Among the many sources of confusion has been the existence
of a plethora of "premiums." The Michigan Supreme Court
agreed "that there is no law which prevents a purchaser from
' 22
paying a premium in connection with the purchase of shares.
Was this the same premium that the New York court had in mind
in Gabriel-Lionel when it held that "Defiance, who controlled
the management of Lionel, when it illegally sold such control,
23
must account to Lionel in this action for the illegal profit?"
Was it the same "premium price. . . paid for the ... transfer of
• . . control that was the all important emolument of the trans-

24
action" according to the same New York court in Caplan-Lione?
In Matter of Carter, what was meant by: "[T] here was
no premium paid for control?" 25 What was the nature of the
premium condoned by the court in Manacher v. Reynolds when

it stated, "No other factor being present, they may demand a
reasonable premium for the use of their key?" 26 In Essex Universal, Chief Judge Lumbard said for the court, "There is no
question of the right of a controlling shareholder under New
York law normally to derive a premium from the sale of a controlling block of stock. '27 In his concurring opinion Judge
Friendly was not so sure of the legality of the premium. He
stated:
This seems to me a wrong to the corporation and the other
stockholders [the transfer of control with less than 50 per cent
stock ownership] which the law ought not countenance, whether
28
the selling stockholder has received a premium or not.
Did the concurring judges have the same premiums in mind
as the majority? The Porter v. Healy court called the premium
a" 'bonus'. .

29
paid. . for this control."

The point seems clear.

A precise legal definition is long

22. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 587, 141
N.W.2d 36, 45 (1966).
23. Gabriel Indus., Inc. v. Defiance Indus., Inc., (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County) in 151 N.Y.L.J. No. 119, at 13, col. 8 (June 17, 1964) (Serafite,
J.), aff'd mem., 23 App. Div. 2d 630, 260 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1st Dep't 1965).
24. Matter of Lionel Corp. at 14, col. 5.
25. Matter of Carter (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 151 N.Y.L.J. No.
103, at 17, col. 1 (May 26, 1964), affd, 21 App. Div. 2d 543, 251 N.Y.S.
2d 378 (1st Dep't 1964).
26. 39 Del. Ch. 401, 423, 165 A.2d 741, 754 (1960).
27. 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962).
28. Id. at 581.
29. Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
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overdue. Yet it is equally clear that all these could not have
been the same "premium." Some selection must be made, but
on what grounds and for what reasons? Grant, ex arguendo,
that there are many validly definable "premiums." Are all worthy of the same intensive analysis? Reflection will reveal that
one premium stands out, and it alone necessitates an intensive
analysis.
The definition must represent a legal analysis of a discernible
premium, accepted by a consensus, and discussion must not degenerate into a factual quibble over its presence or absence.
Grant the factual presence of a premium; what exactly are its
constituent elements? Leave the factual vagaries, as collaterally important as they are, for another time.30 This inhibition
may be especially annoying to those who have so long desired
to unfold the complications of the more involved instances of
spurious premiums (to begin at the end instead of the beginning, as it were). Here, however, patience is essential. The very
cause for so much chaos has been the refusal to learn first the
abc's of the true premium before attempting to explore all the
confusing limitations.
B.

THE WommG D INITioN

Remarkably, these somewhat demanding strictures can be
met. Courts and commentators over the years from Sugden 31 to
Laurenzano32 have ascribed, more often than first meets the
mind, one meaning to the term "premium." This meaning relates to the controleur's fiduciary duty and is consequently most
fundamental and important.
At the turn of the century, the New York Court of Appeals,
quoting the Appellate Division, penetrated to the core, and presented a starting definition of the technical "premium" in the
sale of control:
The question is, therefore, presented, whether . .. (William H1.
Law] is bound to account for the money received from Levy for
the transfer to him and his associates of the management and
control of the Life Union ....
The learned Appellate Division has treated this transactionas a bribe paid to the directors
of the Life Union by Levy .... 33
30. A second series concerning the premium will endeavor to apply the legal analyses to the factual complexities in: The Sale-ofControl Premium: The Fact Question.
31. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C.C. 1856).
32. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
33. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 80, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899) (emphasis added).
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The Appellate Division was correct. The premium in the sale
of control is nothing other than a bald bribe, some special consideration calculated to influence the incumbent in his appointment of a new man to the office of corporate control. Broadly,
the premium is an inducement paid to the controleur to breach
his fiduciary duty in the specific area of the selection of his
successor.
C. A TERm OF ART
Consistent with this tentative definition, therefore (but certainly contingent on later elaboration), and pursuant to an undeniable need for a technical control lexicon, the term "premium-bribe" is submitted as referable to the concept of a bribe paid
for the sale of control.3 4 Let this usage be sacrosanct. Designate
all other non-bribe emolument or consideration by other termsbonus, investment value, deferred compensation, gift, convenience cost, whatever-but confine '"premium-bribe" to nothing
other than a bribe.
D. Reductio ad Absurdum
The ancient logical device of the reductio ad absurdum was
not so very absurd. The fallible human mind can discern a
delicate nuance and subtle ethical principle when the true-to-life
fact situation embodying them is reduced to the utter simplicity
of a primitive drama. To the contrary, if the fragile intellect is
forced first to extricate the essentials from a bewildering maze
of interlocking boards, syndicate controleurs, fluctuating market
values, working-control stock blocks, and the like, little energy
remains to evaluate the legal issues behind the complexities.
The turn-of-the-century case of McClure v. Law3 is just
such an apposite reductio. No one can dispute the McClure
facts. Contrary to the sale-of-control premium so often before
the courts or commentators in the past, the premium there
stands large and clear, and apt for definition. Just what it was
37
36
that was objectionable in Perlman v. Feldmann, Green Giant,
34. There is something gross about the term "bribe," but the English language offers no appropriate euphemistic substitute. Try as one
might, no circumlocution can hide the fact that consideration paid for
the appointment is a bribe. At first, the term "premium" was thought
to be adequate, but it proved to be both too bland and insufficiently
pejorative. Besides it is dilute with many another meaning. 'Premiumbribe" seemed a suitable compromise.
35. 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
36.

219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).

37. Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962).
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or Essex Universal38 might be difficult at first to discern, but
in McClure no one should have any doubts.
The Life Union Association was a New York mutual life
insurance company. As with all such cooperative or assessment-plan companies, each member was at once an insurer and
an insured. No stockholders exist, only members. No set premiums are levied. Assessments are later laid to indemnify a
member's loss. In the late 1800's during the presidency of William H. Law "the members of the company had every reason to
believe . . . that its affairs were in a flourishing condition."3 9
This flourishing state of Life Union was impressive, and "it
seems that one Mr. Louis P. Levy desired for his own purposes
to procure the control of it and for that purpose he made a contract"40 with Mr. William H. Law and the other board members
"to the effect substantially that he would pay them the sum of
$15,000, in consideration ....
[T]he result was that these trustees transferred to Levy the full control of the corporation whose
,,41
interests they were bound to protect ....
The transfer was achieved by the then-novel seriatim resignation of the board.42 According to the plan, the Law men
would resign their offices as directors from time to time, as
[Levy] might request, and would substitute in their places
other persons, to be nominated by him, so that he and his
creatures might have the entire control of the corporation.
As might be expected, shortly after this transaction was
completed the affairs of the Life Union ceased to flourish, and
within a few months it went into the hands of a receiver
.43

As receiver, David McClure undertook to put together again as
much of the Life Union Association as was possible. His first
38. Essex Universal v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
39. McClure v. Law, 20 App. Div. 459, 461, 47 N.Y.S. 84, 85 (1897).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Interestingly, Congress recently passed legislation requiring full
disclosure of corporate equity ownership in corporate takeover bids:
Any person who ... after acquiring... any equity security of
a class which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or
any equity security issued by a closed-end investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, is directly
or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of
such class shall ... file with the Commission, a statement containing... the following information ... (C) if the purpose of
the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire control of
the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals which such
persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its stock to or
merge it with any other persons, or to make any other major
change in its business or corporate structure ....
Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 13(d) (1) (C), 82 Stat. 454.
43. McClure v. Law, 20 App. Div. 459, 461, 47 N.Y.S. 84, 85 (1897).
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step was an action to recover from William H. Law, the former
president and director of the Life Union, $3,000 he had gained
ccout of his trust relationship with the company," and his share
of the money flowing from Levy under the agreement by which
Law "undertook to deliver ... the absolute control and management of the Life Union Association. .... -44
Receiver McClure met with success in the New York Supreme Court, but suffered an inexplicable reversal in the Appellate Division on the antiquated theory that the corporation could
not recover under an ultra vires contract. The Court of Appeals,
however, was not to be deceived by a logical conclusion from an
illogical premise and not only ordered the $3,000 over to Life
Union, but adduced in support sound reasoning:
The question is ... whether the defendant is bound to account
for the money received from Levy for the transfer to him and
his associates of the management and control of the Life
Union, together with its property and effects. The learned Appellate Division has treated this transaction as a bribe paid to
the directors of the Life Union by Levy, and reached the conclusion that the money did not belong to the corporation. We
think, however, that the law does not permit the defendant
to
4
avail himself of his own crime as a defense to this action. 5
The Court of Appeals then proceeded to found its decision on
46
Sugden v. Crosslandl
(which was on all fours) and to apply its
trust reasoning without qualification:
As President and Director of the Life Union he was bound to account to that association for all moneys that came into his
hands by virtue of his official acts, and he cannot be permitted
to shield himself from such liability under the claim that his
acts were illegal and unauthorized. As an officer he had the
right to resign, but the money was not paid to him for his resignation. It was paid over upon condition that he procure Levy
and his friends to be elected directors and given the control
and management, together with the property and effects of the
corporation. The election of directors and the transfer of the
management and property of the corporation were official acts,
and whatever money he received from such official acts were
moneys derived47by virtue of his office for which we think he
should account.
The case could not have been simpler. Unencumbered by
shareholders and a concomitant sale of control-bearing shares,
McClure reduces the transaction to the absurdity of a sale of
control of Life Union for a $15,000 premium. Without the onerous, and sometimes impossible, chore of segregating the true in44. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 79, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
45. Id. at 80, 81, 55 N.E. at 389.
46. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C.C. 1856).

47. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 81, 55 N.E. 388, 389 (1899).
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vestment value of accompanying shares, the McClure premium
stands stark, in the words of the Appellate Division, "as a bribe. ' 4
Just as the Weyenberg-Florsheim case study 49 illumined a
legitimate transfer of control, McClure will supply the background for the ensuing definition of the illegitimate premium.
From these remarks, it can be seen that this article has a
two-fold purpose: (1) to define the one central concept, the
premium as a bribe, without the double disability of complex legal refinement and cloudy fact situations and thus (2) to supply a reliable and basic definition of the premium-bribe toward
further study of its nature, role and disposition.

E. THE PRE

UM IN PERSPECTIVE

A major source of misconception has been the failure to lay
bare the mechanics of the sale of control and the place of the
premium-bribe. Never have they been seen for what they really
are. To get the sale and the premium-bribe in proper focus,
begin with two basic premises: (1) Every transfer of control, of
whatever kind, is very simply the appointment of a new person
to the office of controleur. For some reason the incumbent is
leaving. He finds a willing successor. Control has been transferred. (2) Every transfer of control is not a sale of control, but
every sale is a transfer. The "sale" is a limited species of the
genus "transfer"--the sale is a transfer for a price. The sale, in
effect, adds only one new element-the premium paid for the
appointment. Never does a non-sale transfer directly involve
money passing from appointee to controleur.
In view of these premises, "sale of control" should be re48. Id. This issue will receive further consideration in "The Investment Value in Control Stock," an article now in preparation by this
author.
49. The Weyenberg-Florsheim case is a fascinating instance of a
completely untainted transfer. Old Mr. Weyenberg, patriarch and founder of his shoe company, was ready to retire at age 82, but no Weyenberg heir was up to the job. A long search found a suitable successor
in Thomas W. Florsheim of the famous Florsheim name. Far from exacting a premium-bribe, Weyenberg sold some of his shares to Florsheim
at approximately market value and guaranteed control by a wide dispersal in a large-block secondary offering. Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The Weyenberg Shoe Florsheim Case Study, 18 STAN.
L. REV. 438 (1966), reprinted in CoiwoRATE CouNsEL's A~xuALr 147-68
(H. Friedman, H. Schlagman, &M. Bender ed. 1966). The broad control
hypothesis of ownership-control separation postulates the absolute duty
in the incumbent to appoint his successor, given the need and the ability. The owner alone, of course, has the right to appoint the initial
controleur. Unless the appropriator reassumes dominion and the role of
the owner, successive appointments and selections are in the incumbent.
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served exclusively for the illegitimate transfer involving a premium bribe and "transfer of control" for all non-bribe appointments. As additions to the control argot, "transfer" and "sale"
should eliminate some loose terminology and loose concepts underneath.
Once one conceives control as "a valuable commodity," or as
Judge Lumbard's "personalty" 50 or Berle's "corporate asset" 51
rather than a relation of rights and duties, questions arise as to
the ownership of the commodity, its value, and its salability.
The result is a long line of inexact reasoning. So too, if the concept is the "sale of the office," rather than a bribe to induce appointment to the office. To the contrary, the office is never sold,
always remains, is essential to the corporation, never leaves or
changes, and is always occupied. What is sold is the occupancy,
and the price paid for the occupancy is the premium-bribe.
F. THE KINs OF TRANSFER
Fortunately for the corporate world the overwhelming majority of control changeovers are effected legitimately, and
hence never elicit litigation. The recent release of General Motors by the DuPonts, and Mr.'Weyenberg's appointment of Mr.
Florsheim as confroleur of Weyenberg Shoe are just such legitimate transfers. Far more fascinating, but equally legitimate, was
the selection of little known Albemarle Paper Corporation as
'controleur of the vast GM-SONJ Ethyl Corporation. 52 However,
the necessary absence of a premium-bribe in a legitimate transfer circumscribes the problem areas and correspondingly limits
its value as a vehicle for the study of corporate control. For
present purposes the abuse of the power is more rewarding than
its use.
Among illicit transfers the sale is pre-eminent; fraud, duress
and blackmail are rare. It is also most prolific of problems which
require the construction of a code for their solution. Although
the culpable appointment of an inept son or an unsuitable associate is an illegitimate transfer, which is not a sale and does
pose conflict-of-interest control questions, the resulting problems
are not comparable to those created by the outright sale.
50. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962).
51. Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 CoLmJ.
L. REv. 1212

(1958).

52. Ethyl Corp. Annual Report 1965.
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G. CoNcomrrANT STOCK
The greatest deterrent to the definition of the premium, the
construction of a control code, and the development of a philosophical consensus has been the intrusion of the fact problems
raised by the legitimate sale of a block of stock, controlling or
otherwise, concomitant to the sale of control. Undoubtedly,
most confusion and consequent dispute would disappear if these
two distinct and essentially unrelated acts-the sale of stock and
the selection of a successor for a price-were studied and evaluated in completely separate treatises. This is exactly the prerequisite to the present analysis. Whether a premium was imbedded in the $2 million over market moving from Essex Universal to Yates,0 3 in the $2.1 million received by C. Russell Feld,
mann from the Wilport Syndicate, 54 or in the $7 million that
passed in Fenestra5 are all complicated questions of fact. Let
judge or jury so determine the matter. In Sugden,;6 no such
fact question clouded the legal issue. The £75 stood stark and
alone with no stock involved. Similarly, in McClure,r7 no estimation of investment value distracted the court from the sole operative fact; Levy paid Law and friends $15,000 for the control
of Life Union. Since no stockholders, there was no stock; since
no stock, there was no investment-value problem.
Clearly, therefore, the piesence or absence of concomitant
stock is legally irrelevant to the presence or absence of a premium-bribe. If a premium-bribe is in fact embedded in the price
paid for the stock, the transfer is a sale of control, as apparently
8
in Lionel,5
Feldmann,59 and Essex Universal.6° If there is no
premium-bribe, the transfer, with accompanying block of stock, is
61
perfectly legitimate-apparently the case in Fenestra,
Weyen2
63
berg, GM-DuPont and Albemarle-Ethyl.
Whether the block
is controlling, as in Albemarle-Ethyl, or noncontrolling, as in
53. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
54. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
55. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141
N.W.2d 36 (1966).
56. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C.C. 1856)..
57. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
58. Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913,
aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
59. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
60. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
61. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141
N.W.2d 36 (1966).
62. Bayne, supra note 49.
63. Ethyl Corp. Annual Report 1965.
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Weyenberg or GM-DuPont, is also irrelevant as long as no premium-bribe prevails.
In summary, four possibilities exist: (1) a transfer of control with neither stock nor premium-bribe-conceivably, thus, in
a transfer of AT & T; (2) a transfer of control with concomitant
stock, but no premium-bribe-thus, Weyenberg; (3) a sale of
control with both stock and premium-bribe-thus, allegedly,
Muscat-Sonnabend in Lionel;64 and (4) a sale of control, no stock
but premium-bribe--as Sugden 65 and McClure.60
H. THE PHILosoPHIcAL BACKGROUND
To place the premium-bribe in proper philosophical perspective, one must begin with the central philosophical event in the
premium-bribe question-the selection of a successor-controleur.
No transfer can be made, no sale of control consummated, no
appointment to the office effected, and no premium-bribe paid
or accepted, before a specific individual person has been chosen
for the privilege and the burden of the office of controleur.
Every applicant for the appointment, as much a Florsheim as a
Levy, inescapably must present himself for approval. Whether
the controleur seeks to sell or the aspirant buy, briber must meet
bribed before a premium-bribe can pass. In this selection all
the fiduciary obligations of an outgoing controleur coalesce.
I. THE FiDuciARY DUTY n f TH SELECTION
However important his day-to-day and year-to-year decisions, none approaches the gravity of the controleur's last official act. True, every in-tenure selection of personnel affects the
corporate well-being intimately, but the choice of a successor
crystallizes completely the controleur's contribution to the corporate future. If he fails in the selection of a successor, the
controleur fails in the end. Consequently, this last act should
be subjected scrupulously to the fiduciary norms of the office.
The controleur has, by definition, total dominion of the entity. He is the ultimate authority in the policy-making hierarchy,
and into his custody all the corporate assets have been entrusted.
In acquiescing to this appropriation, the controleur has accepted
an unqualified stewardship, with its attendant obligations. Here
64.

Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913,

aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).

65. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C.C. 1856).
66. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N-.E. 388 (1899).
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is the ultimate manifestation of the custodial concept of corporate control.
At this point, a third subduty of the total set of obligations
emerges: to secure the best possible personnel. 67 Clearly implicit in this third subduty is the five-fold norm of appointee
suitability: (1) moral integrity, (2) intellectual competence,
(3) managerial and organizational proficiency, (4) social acceptability, and (5) satisfactory age and health. s Thus, whatever
else transpires in any transfer of control, and no less so in a
sale, the central concern is the suitability of the successor. Since
controleur as incumbent possesses the stewardship, and since
successor as appointee has acquiesced in the stewardship, both
are bound to the broad duty and the fivefold norm as well.
J.

THE TECHmNCAL DEFIrFiON

One must bear in mind at the outset that the function of the
definition is only to discover the exact nature of the premiumbribe. The definition will not include an analysis of the role of
the premium-bribe in the overall philosophy of corporate control,
but will serve as a prelude to a later study of that question.
The objective now, therefore, is a close scrutiny, element by element, to determine exactly what a premium-bribe is.
Next, do not become impatient with exactitude. Many of
the control problems disturbing the courts today are caused by
differing points of reference. It would be difficult to be overly
exact. How absurd it is, in a later analysis of intrinsic illegitimacy, to be uncertain about the subject of the illegitimacy.
III.

THE FIVE ELEMENTS OF THE PREMIUM-BRIBE

Broken down into its five principal parts, the sale-of-control
premium-bribe can thus be technically defined as (1) some form
of consideration, monetary or otherwise, (2) flowing to the incumbent controleur, (3) from or on behalf of the prospective controleur, (4) to induce the appointment to the office of control, (5)
paid knowingly, scienter.
Although the premium-bribe is indisputably a bribe, it is a
peculiar type of bribe with its own special features. A bribe after
67. The other two subduties are excellence in corporate structure and managerial policy. Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22, 45 (1963).
68. Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control, 33 FoRDHAm L. REv. 583,
593 (1965).
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all can be used to achieve many objectives other than merely the
appointment to an office, especially the office of control. The
premium-bribe has all the features of the common bribe, and one
more. By definition, unlike the ordinary bribe, the premiumbribe consideration must be passed by the would-be controleur
himself. In short, the individual character of the premium-bribe
can only be discerned in the context in which it is inextricably
involved, the context of corporate control.
A.

THE ExIsTmcE OF CONSIDERATION

The first of many problems facing the fact-finder in the
analysis of the premium-bribe is the ascertainment of the presence of some consideration. Consideration must be present or
the discussion is over; if it is present, the definition can go forward.
The chore for the fact-finder is simple when the consideration
is cash and the parties make no attempt to hide it. Such was the
case in Sugden,69 where the £75 was clearly a bribe, and in McClure v. Law, 70 where Mr. Levy b~atantly contracted with Mr.
Law and the board to pay them the sum of $15,000, in consideration for the full control of the corporation.7 1
But the consideration is not always so easily identified. In
the famous Caplan-Lionel case, 72 the court found no difficulty
in isolating the $135,000 consideration paid by Sonnabend to the
Muscat group, because this represeni'ed the exact excess over the
market value of the small three per cent block. And, even more
to the point, it was also $135,000 more than the Muscat men had
paid Roy Cohn for the very same stock only seven months earlier.
But all possible conjectures would be unavailing to condemn Roy
Cohn himself for a similar consideration from Muscat-unless
founded on some highly successful detection and a piecing together of many disparate parts. On the face of things no such
consideration was present.
Patently, the consideration need not be cash. The form may
vary from job patronage to contract allocation to the use of a
yacht or a summer home. Even more subtle for the fact-finder
would be a set of intangibles which forestall not only evaluation
but even identification. For years, the incumbent controleur
69. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C.C. 1856).
70. 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
71. Id. at 79, 55 N.E. at 388.
72. Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913,
aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
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may have coveted the presidency of the Detroit Athletic Club, or
admission into the Bronxville Square Mile or the Down Town
Association of the City of New York. The kinds of consideration
are limited only by the ingenuity of human desire. Consider, for
example, a cumulative pattern of Christmas gifts, a long-term
low-interest loan, or perennial purchases below market.
The point is simple. Judge and jury must conclude that
consideration is present in one form or another or the first element of the definition of the premium-bribe is absent.
B.

MOVEMENT OF CONSIDERATION TO THE INCUIBENT CONTROLEUR

On occasion, the premium-bribe consideration is not only
visibly present but its path to a point of rest in the controleur is
also unmistakable. More often, however, the path is more like a
maze. Yet nothing could be more essential to the definition. A
premium-bribe can scarcely be ascribed to the incumbent unless
the consideration can be traced with certainty into his hands.
The New York case of Laurenzano v. Einbender73 illustrated
the difficulty of tracking the consideration to its terminus.
There, the two-man controleur of Retail Centers of the Americas,
Incorporated, "bought 690,100 shares of Retail stock from Dobin
and Home,giving National voting control of Retail .... ,,74 The
deal after all seemed simply "a sale by Dobin and Home of a
bare majority of Retail's voting stock to National at less than

market value.

. .

.

15

The only conclusion is that Dobin and

Horne wanted out, and National struck a good bargain.
Certainly nowhere did any consideration flow visibly to the
incumbent controleurs-other than the money for the stock, a
just price at worst. However, as minority-shareholder, Laurenzano saw the picture-a second transaction, designed presumably
as a camouflage, hiding the extra consideration that smacked of a
premium-bribe--and tied it directly to the incumbent controleurs.
This second phase of the deal was effected by the newly appointed controleur, National Industries, Incorporated, after Dobin
and Home had left Retail. At the insistence of National, its new
controleur, Retail Centers of Americas, Incorporated, graciously
determined to redeem the remaining shares still owned by excontroleurs Dobin and Home. Mr. Laurenzano summarized the

move as:
73. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
74. Id. at 358.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
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• . . a redemption of the remaining twenty-odd percent of the

Dobin and Home stock at an excessive cost to Retail through
National's exercise of its control over Retail (amounting ...

to

National's paying a premium for the Dobin-Horne control stock
out of Retail's assets). .... 76

Subject to proof by Laurenzano, here was a routine attempt to
disguise the consideration of a premium-bribe.
Laurenzano carries a double message. First, in spite of circuity and camouflage, extra effort can unearth premium-bribe
consideration, even though buried in an apparently unrelated
transaction. Second, the consideration need not move during incumbency, but may well occur after resignation when seemingly
no connection remains. Post-resignation payment in no way alters the fact; consideration passed to the former controleur as
controleur.
But the subterfuge in Laurenzano was hardly challenging.
An imaginative controleur has an intriguing array of possibilities:
an enlightened program (with an added cynical tax value) of
charitable donations to the appointee's longtime but deeply impoverished friend who fortuitously happens also to be the controleur's brother-in-law; favorable, but not alarmingly so, contracts awarded to the wholly owned subsidiary of the incumbent's
wholly owned corporation; or a sinecure, summer after summer,
to the son of the controleur. All of these are at least slightly
more deceiving than Laurenzano.
In the end, as with the consideration itself, the task for the
fact-finder resolves itself into one question: Did the consideration actually pass to or for the incumbent controleur? Of course,
if the ruse is sufficiently successful the proof will fail. But the
objective remains, nonetheless, to strip away the camouflage.
With success here, the second essential of the definition is confirmed and one new element is added; the terminus of the consideration is the controleur.
C.

MOVEiENT OF CONSIDERATION FROM THE PROSPECTIVE
CONTROLEUR

As with the identification of the consideration and its proven
reference to the incumbent, the verification of the third element
is at worst not a greatly demanding assignment for the factfinder. At best, it is as simple as laying the blame on Levy for the
$15,000 admittedly paid to Law, or holding Crossland liable in
76. Id. at 359.
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Sugden7 7 as the source of the £75 paid to Horsfield to bribe him
out of office. But whether simple or difficult, an essential to the
premium-bribe is the indisputable nexus with the appointee.
Whether there is a patent payment directly from the appointee himself, or indirectly from some third party, or a complicated series of moves from the controlled corporation, one
overriding principle prevails-the consideration must be the primary responsibility of the appointee. Regardless of appearances,
all three sources must be reducibly the same. He must be proven
the debtor and be legally liable for the amount.
1.

Directly From the Appointee

Not all payments are as bald as Sugden,78 McClure,79 or
Caplan-Lionel.8 0 As with receipt, so it is with payment; an
appointee-owned corporation might impose a series of rates and
charges sufficiently below market, for example, to aggregate in a
ten-year period a stipulated $100,000.
The use of his private plane, his Palm Springs cottage, or his
country club privileges could coalesce almost imperceptibly into
a formidable outlay by an eager suitor. Whether the benefits
pass before or after a successful sale of control is again irrelevant.
Nor does a prorated payment for tax purposes diminish account-

abfity.
2.

Indirectlyfrom Third Parties

Perhaps the most difficult of detection of all devices is the
use of a third-party friend, relative or debtor. With such cooperation, the would-be controleur can channel substantial sums to the
incumbent. Gifts funneled through appointee relatives or friends
could probably be satisfactorily concealed. True, if the debtor
understandably wishes an acknowledgment of satisfaction, this
fact could be revealing. However, the only clamorous evidence
generally would be muffled in the personal accounts of the
parties. With no external evidence of a suspicious payment, how
untoward to insist on a fishing expedition for an unexplained
debt-cancellation or a receipt from an unlikely payor.
In the case of a premium-bribe-prone suitor, increased atten77. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C.C. 1856).
78. Id.
79. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
80. Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913,
a-f'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
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tion by the courts to the sale-of-control premium-bribe predictably will result in greater resort to such third-party duplicity,
and thus diminish the chances of ferreting out the hidden consideration of a premium-bribe.
3.

Indirectly from the Controlled Corporation

Although definitely begging a later question, nearly every
successful premium-bribe is sooner or later recouped from the
corporation. Often, however, the new appointee avoids the circuity of a personal payment and later corporate recoupment by
an immediate raid on the corporate till.
Perhaps the most common method of corporate payment is
the unearned-salary or consultation-fee device. In CaplanLionel,8 ' appointee Sonnabend was prepared to approve a $75,000
outlay over a five-year period to the former controleur, the Muscat group. In another recent case continuing payments to the
outgoing controleur were openly stipulated in the contract:
Woike would cause the corporation to employ Wilcox as consultant for five years at a total salary of $118,541, upon the
* understanding that Wilcox was not to be required to spend
more than twenty-five percent of his regular business hours in
performing his duties, and that in no event were such duties
to unreasonably interfere with his other activities .... 82
Possibly as a presage for the future, this consultation-fee
formula has been used recently in the sale of a nonprofit corporation, The --General Hospital:
We now understand that Mrs. -_ proposed to donate the
capital stock of the Hospital 'Corporation to a local church and
the corporation in turn is to retain Dr. - and Mrs. - under
longterm employment and consultation agreements providing
for, we understand, compensation at approximately the same
levels they are presently receiving.
We further understand, incidentally, that Mrs. - has no
formal education or practical training in hospital management
[and that Dr. - is mentally incompetent].83
As with the other facets of the premium-bribe consideration,
the only limit to the variety of the corporate disbursement is
human resourcefulness. Retention of the former controleur as
honorary chairman could mean important emolument-executive
perquisites, continuing prestige and social position, appreciable
-

81.

Id.

82. Oser v. Wilcox, 338 F.2d 886, 888 n.2 (9th Cir. 1964).
83. Letter to the author. This example was-related by an attorney
whose client was prepared to "buy" the hospital for over one million
dollars.
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financial savings and benefits---completely apart from a bald, unearned salary. The premium-bribe can also come indirectly from
the corporate treasury by the deft use of the manufacturer'sagent ploy.
In Laurenzano the successful suitor, National Industries, Incorporated, caused the controlled corporation, Retail Centers of
the Americas, Incorporated, to redeem
*. . the remaining twenty-odd per cent of the Dobin and Horne
stock at an excessive cost to Retail through National's exercise
of its control over Retail (amounting . . . to National's paying
a premium for the Dobin-Horne control stock out of Retail's
assets), and a sale of G*E*S to Retail at an excessive price
(recouping most of National's cash outlay for the control
stock) .84
One wonders if Glen Alden-Schenley-Rosenstiel in late March of
1968 envisaged the same corporate-till approach of National Industries-Retail Centers-Dobin and Home. The stockholder's suit
against Schenley Industries, its directors, and Glen Alden Corporation, charges that Glen Alden intends to use Schenley funds to
retire the six-month notes given Mr. Rosenstiel as part of the payment for his 945,126 shares of Schenley stock, to pay the public
holders the cash portion of Glen Alden's offer for their shares,
and to repay Glen Alden's borrowings to finance the cash portion
of Mr. Rosenstiel's payment.8,
Whatever the device, the result is the same. The appointee
passes a premium-bribe, either directly to the controleur or
through third parties or from the corporation itself. In the end,
the establishment of this third element requires proof of ultimate
responsibility in the appointee for the amount involved.
D.

PURPOSE TO INDUCE THE APPOINTMENT TO THE OFFICE OF
CONTROL

A conceptual nicety, but a relevant one, is in order. Obviously the premium-bribe in itself does not entail action; it is not
an act. Yet the money or consideration involved can never become the premium-bribe without first becoming the sole and
principal object of an act. This act is the act of bribery and,
strictly speaking, bribery and not the premium-bribe is the more
proper subject of this aspect of analysis and definition.
The innermost essence of bribery, and correspondingly of the
premium-bribe, lies in its purpose. Here is the crux of the defini84. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
85. The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 26, 1968, at 6, col. 2.
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tion. The finality of a given action colors it completely and imparts its moral content. To pull a trigger is arguably indifferent.
To pull a trigger at a skeet-shoot is recreation. To pull the same
trigger at an innocent man is murder. But to fend off an aggressor is praiseworthy. The intrinsic gravity of the turpitude, as
well as its presence or absence, lies in the purpose.
Thus, too, the purpose in the premium-bribe imparts the
moral turpitude. If the goal is not the appointment to the office,
the premium-bribe is absent. The mere passing of money from
appointee to controleur is as indifferent as the pull of a trigger.
However, the consideration could be the payment of a just debt,
an overdue salary, a commendable gift-or the inducement to
the appointment. To induce the incumbent to appoint must be,
by definition, the sole purpose of the consideration.
1.

To Buy or To Loot

At this point, a distinction too rarely made, yet disarmingly
simple and altogether essential, must clear the way for much of
the later analysis of the premium-bribe. Distinguish two totally
different objectives: (1) to induce the appointment, and (2) to
loot, or benefit, the corporation. "To induce" is integral to the
premium-bribe. "To loot" is outside its essence.
It would seem that the purpose of the premium-bribe is to
induce the appointment. And the purpose of the appointment
may be to loot the corporation-or not to loot, or to benefit; it
does not matter. The premium-bribe itself in no way involves
the use and disposition of the appointment once secured.
This distinction is important for several reasons other than
its ontological truth. Thus, if one depended on looting or some
similar malefaction such as self-serving contracts, unjustified
nepotism, or exorbitant salaries for the discernment of a premium-bribe, the rare instances would be overlooked where the
briber had such less reprehensible thoughts in mind as social
status, personal power, or even the praiseworthy objectives of a
Robin Hood. Moreover, without this distinction a Robin Hood
might intriguingly argue from a praiseworthy end to a praiseworthy means. Faced vividly with the sole goal of inducement,
however, one could hardly be beguiled by the jesuitical "end
justifies the means" argument. In defining the premium-bribe,
therefore, one must consider only the inducement to the appointment and relegate any other contemplated crimes to discussion
apropos.
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The greatest importance of this distinction, however, lies in
its application to the later study of the intrinsic illegitimacy of
the premium-bribe. If the premium-bribe necessarily includes
post-appointment intentions, good or bad, the premium-bribe correspondingly will be good or bad. But if the inducement is the
sole purpose, the illegitimacy, or the legitimacy, will be determined correspondingly by that purpose. Further, this segment
of the definition is not meant to explain why the premium-bribe
is a perversion-why even a Robin Hood may not buy an appointment. The definition only adverts to the junction of the five
elements. The perversity, or lack of it, is the consequence of this
junction.
Note, however, that the evil designs of the briber are, in fact,
helpful in discerning, but strictly extraneously, the presence of a
premium-bribe. An illicit end suspicions an illicit means. One
who has future evil in mind will not generally cavil at a little evil
en route. Equally possible, however, is the legitimate acquisition
of control with the ultimate objective of looting.
2. The Presumptionof Premium Presence
Closer scrutiny of the simple purpose "to induce" yields
many further insights-seemingly collateral commentary but in
fact essential to the full definition of the situation.
The progress thus far has seen the fact-finder present three
essentials to the definition: (1) some consideration (2) flowing
to the controleur (3) from the appointee. To this has been added,
but without more, the major and controlling element, the purpose
to induce to the appointment. This single purpose, already
sharply delimited, is faced with another major circumscription.
Just as the premium-bribe neither requires nor permits an excess
of purpose, so too with anything less. Any purpose short of inducement is irrelevant. Any consideration for another reason,
legitimate or otherwise, does not constitute a premium-bribe.
With little difficulty, excess of purpose by looter or Robin
Hood can be discerned and eliminated from analysis. But not so
in detecting possible alien non-premium-bribepurposes.
(a)

Clearly Identified Consideration

At this point the justification for the selection of the various
case examples becomes clearer. As with most moral analyses,
the extremes are patent. In the transfers of control of Weyenberg Shoe, of General Motors, and of Ethyl, no consideration at
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88
all was visible. With Sugden,86 McClure,87 and Laurenzano,
it was obtrusively present. No quibbling over facts was possible.
A chief cause for confusion surrounding the premium-bribe
has been the unhesitating and fearless plunge into the midst of
the most complicated fact situations, especially the tortuous "true
investment value" of a "control block" of stock. For example,
who can give an off-the-cuff label to the $2 million premium in
89
Essex Universal?
Is two dollars per share over market-eight
dollars against six dollars-a premium-bribe? Or is it true investment value? Does the 23.7 per cent block of Essex differ from the
three per cent in Lionel? 9 0-or from the stock-less control in
McClure?91 These gray-area questions explain the relegation of
such as Essex to later studies. How the fact-finder determines
the presence of a premium bribe, and the problems he faces in
doing it, should not interrupt the study of its essence. The
knotty investment-value question posed by Essex is not being
dismissed; it will be faced later, with the help of the present

study.
Suffice for the present that the fact-finder has categorically
presented in Sugden, McClure, and The --General Hospital,
clear-cut cases unencumbered by the queries of Essex. If the
Essex fact-finder must throw up his hands in defeat, the matter
is concluded. The application of clear principles to fuzzy facts is
vain.
The £75 in Sugden, the $15,000 in McClure, the salaries in
The
General Hospital case have all been clearly identified.
The problem then remains: What was the purpose of this consideration? Can (1) such consideration passing (2) to controleur
(3) from the appointee have any other purpose than "to induce
the appointment?"
(b)

Avowed Purpose to Induce

Remarkably the day is not over when the parties unabashedly announce their purpose.
A. King McCord, the Westinghouse Air [Brake] chairman,
was particularly critical of Thomas M. Evans, chairman of
Crane, whom he accused of attempting to "force a combination,
86. Sugden v. Crossland, 65 Eng. Rep. 620 (V.C.C. 1856).
87. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
88. Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
89. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
90. Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913,
aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
91. McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
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one way or another," of the two concerns....
Mr. McCord said he was visited three times by Mr. Evans
to discuss merger .... During two of the meetings, Mr. McCord said, Mr. Evans proposed that Mr. McCord become chairman of the executive committee of the surviving corporation
"In the last meeting," Mr. McCord, said, "he (Mr. Evans)
added the suggestion that I would receive an option to purchase
Crane stock and benefits after retirement, possibly by a consulting arrangement."
"On each occasion," Mr. McCord continued, "I told Mr.
Evans that such proposals were inappropriate and shouldn't be
discussed in connection with the suggestion for combining the
companies,
which should be considered strictly on its own
9 2
merits."
In the recent takeover of Silvray-Litecraft Corporation, a
New Jersey producer of architectural lighting, by Shearson,
HIammill, and E. M. Warburg, one wonders if the forthright press
release could possibly mean what it says:
In addition, Messrs. Gilbert and Gordon received $137,000 to
resign their posts. Mr. Roisman will continue as president and
member of the board .... 93
The press release is highly redolent of the statement in Porter v.
Healy: " [T]he price fixed for the stock itself was $165 per share
... and the additional compensation that we were to receive for
parting with our control was an entirely private business matter . . .,94
But such open avowal may not always be forthcoming. What
is to be done when the facts point only to consideration from appointee to controleur? How should one approach the purpose,
unaided by an open admission?
(c)

The Presumption

The fact may be that the parties are readily able to prove a
purpose totally unrelated to a premium-bribe. The consideration
flowing at the time of the transfer may in truth be a genuine
quid for a legitimate quo, a long-due debt, deferred salary, or
even a gracious gift. But these alien purposes must be flushed
out, and the burden lies on the payor and payee to do the flushing.
Toward this objective a presumption seems tenable: When
some consideration, clearly identified, has passed to the incum92. The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1967, at 6, col. 1. See also
The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 28, 1968, at 1, col. 2; May 16, 1968, at 1,
col. 6; Feb. 21, 1968, at 11, cols. 2 and 3.
93. The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 2, 1967, at 4, col. 4.
94. Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 434, 91 A. 428, 431 (1914).
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bent controleur from the prospective appointee under circumstances reasonably related to the control transfer, a rebuttable
presumption arises that the purpose of such consideration is to
induce the appointment. The Presumption of Premium-Bribe
Presence imposes the burden of explanation on the parties to the
transfer. Clearly this approach is negative. Its purpose is to
negate and hence eliminate all irrelevant non-premium-bribe
purposes.
Note, however, that the presumption itself is founded on a
very basic assumption that on first blush would seem to require
proof. The primary purpose of the presumption is truly negative
-to remove from discussion all purpose alien to a premiumbribe. But does the absence of a non-premium-bribe purpose
prove the presence of a premium-bribe purpose? At first blush
the answer is no-on reflection, yes. In the elaboration of the
presumption, assume for later proof that every unexplained or
admittedly relevant consideration is always "to induce the appointment." Thus the present approach is only to show that consideration attendant on the control transfer demands an explanation.
Note that the terminology involves an inaccuracy. The title
should rather read: The Presumption of the Presence of the Purpose to Induce. But the purpose "to induce" is so predominantly
the essential part of the premium-bribe that such a transposition
seems acceptable, even preferable. In future usage simply recall
that the whole is used for the part, albeit somewhat loosely.
3. The Rebuttal of the Presumption
The explanation of any suspicious emolument should not be
difficult, unless, of course, the suspicions are well-founded.
Indebtedness. Of all possible alien consideration a bona fide
debt should be the most easily verified. If a direct deal occurs,
the debtor-appointee will show the sum on his books. In any
event the creditor-controleur will certainly carry the amount on
his. If the debt is long standing the bookkeeping evidence should
be cumulative. If recent, the causes, occasions and circumstances,
as well as any parties involved, should be fresh and readily substantiated. In either event, the quid for the suspect quo should
be patent.
Salary. The presumption of premium-bribe presence might
not have been so strong in the case of the salaries of Mrs. _
and Dr.
specified in the "gift" to the local church had not
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originally attempted to extract $1.3 million for the
Mrs.
sale of "her" nonprofit hospital. Such salaries would be no more
suspect than a similar salary for Patriarch Weyenberg were he
consultant to Weyenberg Shoe.95 But the point in either case is
the need, not the ease, of explanation. In fact the New York Court
in Caplan-Lione90 saw the need and apparently felt that Sonnabend and Muscat were unsuccessful in their explanation of the
97
$75,000 to the Muscats over five years. In Oser v. Wilcox one
would be justified in demanding a similar explanation from Wilcox and Woike, since the $118,541 paid to Wilcox "as consultant
for five years" was virtually indistinguishable from the Muscat
$75,000.
Gifts. Christmas and Hanukkah, birthdays and anniversaries should constitute no particular fact-finding problem. Only
when the beneficence transcends the customs of a locality, social
stratum, financial competence, or the established pattern between donor and donee, does the presumption of premium-bribe
presence come into operation. The books are full of apt analogies,
especially in the tax field, involving purchasing agents, suppliers,
the five percenters and the historic vicuna coat. The norm is the
reasonable gift set off against an amount efficacious enough to
constitute a satisfactory premium-bribe.
Deferred Compensation. One of the more appealing methods of camouflaging a premium-bribe is the subterfuge of accrued
compensation. In a related context, old Mr. Cosgrove, after retirement from the presidency of Green Giant, felt that the two
million dollars for the transfer of control could well be the capitalization of his former salary.98 This device of the deferred
compensation perhaps deserves greater study. In sum, however,
the principal questions would seem to be: Why was the compensation not paid when earned? Was the original employment contract silent on the matter? Why wait until the transfer of control? Should a third party pay a corporate salary?
All these examples say the same thing. Any yacht clubs,
perquisites, any unusual emolument, gifts or payment, demand
an explanation. This is not unreasonable or intrusive. All the
controleur need do is simply show that the debt, the salary, and
the gift are completely unrelated to an inducement to the appoint95. See note 49, supra.
96. Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913,
aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
97. 338 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1964).
98. Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962).
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ment. When an accused can account for the consideration, the
premium-bribe evanesces.
4. The Rationale of the Presumption
Three cogent reasons converge to justify such a demand on
the principal parties to the control transfer. First, at that
charged instant when control passes from controleur to appointee, the complete custody of the corporation hangs precariously in the grasp of each, the one relinquishing, the other assuming. At this moment, therefore, both are logically strict
trustees. As such, both are bound to forego any emolument of
any kind connected with the trust corpus. The very hypothesis
of a trust relationship is the benefit-to-beneficiary rule.
Equally logically, then, an immediate explanation is incumbent on both, since (1) both are trustees; (2) trustees garner all
for the beneficiaries; (3) whatever is passing to trustee rather
than beneficiaries is suspect; (4) whatever is suspect requires
explanation; and (5) whatever is unexplained can only be assumed to induce the transfer. The least obligation engendered
by this benefit-to-beneficiary rule would be an accounting of the
suspect consideration.
Second, of all the acts of his corporate career the most important is probably the controleur's appointment of a successor,
an act fraught with deep trust implications, determinative of the
long-term future well-being of the corporation. How completely
unthinkable and unlikely for men of prudence to pass unrelated
consideration at this time. Even grade-school discretion would
caution a contrary course. Thus does the presumption of premium-bribe presence arise. Since only a rare trustee would not
heed such grade-school warnings to wait, any consideration is
damning, and without explanation assumedly induces the appointment.
Finally, the premium-bribe presumption could be justified
for a far lesser reason- a readiness to explain. As strict trustees
at the most, as men jealous of their reputation at least, and certainly impelled by the delicacy of the moment, both controleur
and appointee would demand the opportunity to explain.
5. The PresumptionIllustrated
In the spring of 1968 Detroit Steel had been plodding along
at about $18 per share on the New York Stock Exchange in relatively active trading and the firm "had been the subject of take-
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over rumors for months." 99 In fact the controleur of Detroit
Steel, Cleveland financier Cyrus S. Eaton, and William R. Daley,
long associated with Mr. Eaton in widespread business ventures, 0 0 wanted out. Negotiations with the Isbrandtsen interests,
specifically American Export Industries, Incorporated, led to just
the deal: American Export paid $25 per share for 525,000 shares,
or about 13 per cent of the outstanding shares of Detroit Steel
Corporation.' 0 ' With the stock sale
Jakob Isbrandtsen, president of American Export, and Albert
E. Rising, Jr., vice president of American Export, replace Mr.
Eaton and Mr. Daley as directors on the boards of both Detroit
Steel and Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., a Cleveland-based lake
shipping and 1iron
ore concern, which is about 24% owned by
2
Detroit Steel. 0
Apply the presumption of premium-bribe presence to these
facts. A sizable consideration-$3.6 million-$5 to $7, 25 to 39 per
cent, 03 over market, is flowing from the would-be board members to the incumbent controleur under circumstances reasonably
related to the actual appointments and the ostensible transfer of
control. In such a situation would not the fiduciary duty of both
parties call for an explanation of the $5 to $7 over market? Did
not the owners of the other 87 per cent of the outstanding shares
still plodding along at $18 deserve some word?
6.

The "InexplicabZe" Few

Granted the success of the negative aspect of the premiumbribe-presence presumption, does this really end the matter?
Does the elimination of all foreign and unrelated consideration
mean ipso facto that what remains unexplained was passed solely
to induce the incumbent to the appointment?
Consider this situation. The controleur has willingly admitted relevant consideration; or reducibly the same, has failed to
rebut the premium-bribe presumption. But impelled by several
sincere reasons, he stoutly denies any premium-bribe purpose.
99. The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 27, 1968, at 4, col. 2.
100. Id. As president of an Eaton interest, Otis & Co., Mr. William
R. Daley found himself in the midst of a street-shaking securities litigation. Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 856 (1952). For a detailed study of this case, see Bayne,
Kaiser-Frazer v. Otis: A Legal and Moral Analysis, 2 DxPAuL L. Rav.
131 (1953).
101. The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 27, 1968, at 4, col. 2.
102. Id.
103. This parallels exactly the 39 per cent in Ferraioli v. Cantor,
231 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where the total premium was $2.2
million. The shares were sold at $3.50 over the $9 per share market.
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This rather rare controleur concedes that the consideration cannot be explained by the usual human commerce, or by understandable quids for traditional quos. It is neither debt, salary
nor gift. It is transfer related, but nonetheless not designed to
induce. There is consideration, yes; unexplained, yes; but premium-bribe, no. Faced with such a staunch stand, how certain
can one be?
The second thoughts to such questions are generally the
same-impossibly contrary to fact. It is so unreal as to invite
derision. How could an incumbent accept out-of-the-blue consideration and seriously disavow a premium-bribe or call it something else?
(a)

The Justified Gratuity

However absurd and unreal, the haunting doubt persists: Is
every unexplained consideration really a premium-bribe? Is it
invariably passed to induce? Or more subtly, may not the appointment be merely the occasion or the condition rather than
the cause?
Ninety-nine out of 100 cases clearly support the blanket
statement: Every unexplained "gratuity" related to the transfer is causally related. But, however contrary to fact it may be,
an exhaustive inspection cannot overlook the one in 100. If
one may conclude to a premium bribe in such an ultimate instance no problem can remain with the other 99.
Several reasons support a minute dissection of such a "justified gratuity." Beyond a simple search for the truth lies a practical incentive. Any sincere proponent of the justified-gratuity
thesis would undoubtedly concede the illegitimacy if, but only if,
the premium-bribe itself were first identified. The question for
him is not illegitimacy but existence. He sees merely a gratuity,
surely not a premium-bribe.
What type of mind can engender such self-delusion? Antipolar to the hardened operator who admits the premium-bribe
but blandly denies its turpitude, is the well-intentioned entrepreneur, perhaps a bit callow but certainly sincere. The complexities of the modern control transaction, the blas6 approach to
any gratuity, the apparent divorce of the gratuity from the control transfer, have all conspired to lead a limited few into such a
self-delusion.
The Robin Hood explanation also has some fascination. Once
grant such a one-in-a-million entrepreneur with the unimpugn-
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able purpose of building up the company, and the equally incredible fact follows: Such a Robin Hood could fail to see the premium-bribe in his gratuity. This is scarcely remarkable since the
end justifies the means in far less subtle situations.
The most credible rationale, however, has been concocted by
competent corporate counsel. Why should a modified Robin
Hood, untrained in the law but eminently self-made and successful, question his Wall Street attorney when he quotes from
Essex,10 4 Perlman'05 and Fenestra?0 6 After all, Chief Judge
Lumbard for the Second Circuit seemed clear: "There is no question of the right of a controlling shareholder under New York law
normally to derive a premium from the sale of a controlling block
of stock."' 0 7 Judge Swan in the same circuit some seven years
earlier had been equally clear: "Concededly a controlling block
of stock has greater sale-value than a small lot."' 08 The Michigan Supreme Court saw no problem in a similar deal:
Gulf [Gulf American Corporation] concedes the obvious, that is,
that it paid a price per share greater than the market value of
Fenestra but says that there is no law which prevents a purchaser from paying a premium in connection with the purchase of shares.' 0 9
No wonder an unsophisticated entrepreneur concluded that his
is a "justified gratuity." The prestigious Second Circuit nowhere
defines the "premium," certainly does not call it a premiumbribe, and at times openly condones it. True, these very courts in
other contexts have spoken directly to the contrary. But that has
not destroyed the conviction that this gratuity does not induce
the appointment. Certainly these eminent courts would never
permit an outright bribe. Therefore, this gratuity, or premium,
or bonus, or whatever, could not conceivably be a premium-bribe.
Even though a subliminal sense says caution, such an entrepreneur does not pause long enough to strip the situation bare.
As captious as it may seem, the answer to the justified gratuity argument lies in a look at the more subtle delusions possible
to incumbent and appointee. Consider, therefore, a formula least
like a premium-bribe.
104. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
105. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
106. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.
2d 36 (1966).
107. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 576 (2d Cir. 1962).
108. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
109. Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 587, 141
N.W.2d 36, 45 (1966).
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The Mere Gratuity

Assume that at no time have the parties discussed any gratuity, any expected acknowledgment of the gratitude and indebtedness owed the controleur by the appointee for the opportunity
to guide the corporation. Least of all has any mention ever been
made of a premium-bribe. Not even remotely has any deal been
made.
The incumbent controleur has spent long hours in evaluating
all prospective successors. In the appointee he has found all the
qualities demanded by the fivefold norm of suitability-intellectual, moral, managerial, social, physical-as established by his
third subduty of the overall fiduciary duty of corporate control
-the choice of the best possible personnel. He then proceeds to
make his formal selection, installs the appointee, retires from the
scene, and rests content that his fiduciary duty has been done.
With the matter thus completely consummated the appointee
then steps forward, impelled perhaps by the modern and pervasive sense of fair play, and bestows an appropriate gratuity on
the former contr6leur. Or the appointee-Robin Hood, so happy
at the opportunity to help the corporation, effuses gratitude and
wants to thank the controleur by way of a gift. Assume, of
course, that the stipend is substantial.
Faced with such a fact situation the immediate reaction is to
say that here the "consideration" was not paid in order to induce
the appointment since the appointment had already been irrevocably made. The appointee could scarce be buying what he already had. At this point the exact legal philosopher would tend
to retreat, to conclude that possibly here is a mere gratuity, a
non-bribe premium, or perhaps a new, legitimate species. Seemingly, this benefaction is at most "in connection with" or "related
to," but certainly not "to induce."
(c)

A Retroactive Quid Pro Quo

To the contrary, fuller reflection finds no real difference between an avowed purpose to induce and the allegedly legitimate
formula of a post-appointment gratuity. Three factors must be
carefully considered: First, the would-be controleur actually
proffered, consciously and deliberately, a substantial sum of
money or its equivalent. At the same time, and related to the
same deal, the incumbent actually accepted, consciously and deliberately, such substantial sum. Second, the appointee owed the
incumbent absolutely nothing. The incumbent had nothing com-
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ing from the appointee. Third, and possibly most important,
the sum involved was not de minimis. If it were, the parties
would have already explained it as an acceptable gift. A guideline can be reasonably erected. The consideration on one hand
must meet the requirements of an acknowledged premium-bribe
situation. How much, in the estimate of experts, would "buy the
office" involving such prestige, influence, desirability? On the
other hand, what would a man of relative affluence, social status
and habits present to his counterpart as an understandable gift?
With a firm grip on this tripartite reality, one line of reasoning is inescapable. This "mere gratuity" is a belated quid pro
quo, a retroactive settlement of an implicit or sensed contract of
purchase. Such a gift would either be de minimis or clearly discernible by its size as a premium-bribe. Never would an appointee pay such a substantial sum unless he sensed somehow
that he must do so. But the only reason for such feelings
would be the conviction that somehow he owed such an amount.
Yet if appointee owed controleur, the debt must be for something. And the something must be the appointment-which,
of course, is the definition of the premium-bribe.
The motives for such a post-appointment payment are manifold and irrelevant. Implicit could be the fallacious reasoning
encouraged by present-day premium-bribe attitudes that somehow the appointee "owed" the controleur for the appointment;
that although unenforceable in practicality or in law, the controleur somehow "had it coming" and the appointee correspondingly "had to pay" if he wanted the office. In the end the only
explicable attitude that would elicit such post-appointment gratuities would be the subliminal assumption on both sides that
such payment was part of the total understanding, was really
integral to the deal, and was part of the accepted procedure.
Such reflections pose a dilemma. Either the "mere gratuity"
is reducibly a premium-bribe or the parties are simpletons. Gratitude could take on such proportions only in such a rare instance.
7.

The PresumptionConfirmed

These reflections complete the analysis of the presumption
of premium-bribe presence. The parties to a transfer of control
are faced with two governing principles: (1) Any consideration
passing at the time of transfer must be explained. (2) Any unexplained consideration is presumed to have been passed to induce appointment.
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E. SciENER
The inability to say everything at once is a particularly disturbing handicap in the case of scienter. Necessarily, scienter has
been implicit in every single element of the definition, and is
integral to each of the four other essentials. The Latin of scienter
has misled many into the limited meaning of "knowledge" or
more exactly "knowingly," but the legal and philosophical scienter has two components, equally important. Not only must appointee and incumbent have sufficient intellectual appreciation
of the full meaning of the transaction-the "knowingly" of the
Latin-Lbut both must also have a voluntary determination to go
forward with the appointment. Thus sufficient reflection by
the intellect and full consent of the will are sine qua non
to any moral act. And the moral act of bribery is patently incomplete without each of the four other elements: (1) consideration passing (2) to the controleur (3) from the appointee (4) to
induce the appointment. If scienter is absent in any one, the act
may be illegitimate and hence reprehensible, but it is not premium-bribery.
This interaction of the intellect and the will transforms a lifeless, disconnected series of movements into a rational, human,
moral act. By the injection of knowledge and volition the mere
materiality of the consideration becomes the formality of a premium-bribe.
Through scienter the actors assume the act as their own.
Only by knowledge of intellect and consent of will does a homo
rationalis accept liability. Without both, any act is unrational,
not his own, and without responsibility. Turpitude in the air
becomes through scienter the personal baseness of the premiumbribing appointee and the premium-bribed controleur.
1.

The Erroneous Conscience

Here again the subjective state of the parties is pertinent.
Distinguish: (1) the parties, lacking scienter, fail to pass a premium-bribe (and hence are guiltless), and (2) the parties act
knowingly and willingly, but erroneously judge the act blameless
(and hence are guiltless). The subjective moral evaluation of
passing a premium-bribe has nothing to do with its presence or
absence. The allied question of the erroneous conscience concerns the culpability of the parties and arises by hypothesis only
when total scienter is present.
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Scienter and the Purpose to Induce

Confusion could arise between the purpose to induce and the
will to induce. What is the difference between the fourth element of the premium-bribe, the purpose to induce, and the
volition of the fifth, the will to pass the premium-bribe? Since
the distinction is valid and important, the conceptual stages in
the application of the intellect and the will-scienter-to the
other four, but especially the fourth, is warranted.
Begin with the recollection that without scienter the other
four elements, notably the purpose to induce, remain only potential and are not yet reduced to actuality. With this in mind,
the interaction of intellect and will may be conceptualized into
three steps, with the identical process in both appointee and incumbent. (1) The first four elements are laid out in complete
array (a sum of $135,000 would not seem exorbitant to the suitor,
nor insufficient by the incumbent to induce him to accede to the
appointment). (2) As thus laid before the intellect these four
factors are studied thoroughly. Confident, with a full knowledge
and understanding of the entire control transfer, the intellect
passes judgment, giving its approval, and hands this conclusion
on to the will. (3) The will in turn, impelled by the reasoning of
the intellect, freely assents to the transaction. This consent of
the will to the advice of the intellect is scienter. Only now have
appointee and controleur knowingly and willingly embraced a
potential series of actions and vitalized them into the actual,
rational and culpable act of passing a premium-bribe to induce
the appointment. Here then the theoretical purpose to induce
becomes the practical will to effectuate the purpose to induce.
All this explains the relegation of scienter to fifth place.
Each other element had first to be defined before it could be
known and assented to.
3.

Two to Tango

The question naturally arises: Must both appointee and
controleur have scienter? Very simply, technical verification of
the definition requires every single element. And mutual scienter is an element. This rigidity intimately affects appointee suitability, the culpability of the parties, the disposition and the role
of the premium-bribe. Thus a naive appointee lacking scienter
could be guiltless and hence suitable, saving the naivete, even
though he passed an apparent premium-bribe. The culpable controleur, of course, would be forced to disgorge the "premium-
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bribe" and be liable in damages.
Just as the criminal code has stratified homicide according to
knowledge and consent, so also with the premium-bribe. In
cases short of total scienter the principles and philosophy of the
premium-bribe are applicable mutatis mutandis, since some other
unnamed but very real malefaction is indubitably present.
IV. EPILOGUE
A definition often appears to be a simple thing. But as it
unfolds one wonders as many of the complex questions left for
later begin to answer themselves. So it is with the definition of
the premium-bribe. The principal benefit, of course, should be
univocity of meaning. No more should there be premiums and
premiums. Or at least the premium-bribe is now known for what
it really is.

